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The unleashed power of the atom has changed everything 
save our modes of thinking, and we thus drift 
toward unparalleled catastrophe
Albert Einstein
(Otto Nathan and Heinz, eds , Einstein on Peace 
New York Schocken, 1968 )
I
The more we reflect on the nuclear holocaust and the greater our efforts to 
understand its nature, the more we realize the enormous difficulties in 
imagining such an eventuality We do not know what it would be like, how it 
should be conceived, and to what it could be compared Since a nuclear 
holocaust has no precedent m  either scope or scale within the history of human 
civilization, it is a possibility that surpasses the limits of mundane human 
experience and imagination Nuclear war has the potential to bring everything 
in humanity to an end A nuclear holocaust could be the human event to end all 
human events However, we have gathered here today to discuss the unthinkable 
Let us first take the term "nuclear proliferation ” It has acquired a 
particular connotation over the years, and, in most of the literature, it refers 
to the acquisition of nuclear weapon capability by new states
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "proliferation” as a process m  which 
elementary parts grow by multiplication and increase rapidly The term "nuclear 
proliferation", therefore, should cover the growth of nuclear arsenals in 
countries presently possessing nuclear weapons as well In fact, the most 
significant and continuous nuclear proliferation has been undertaken by the
«
?states that currently have nuclear weapons "The spread of nuclear weapons" has 
been a phrase used to refer to the acquisition of nuclear weapon capability by 
new states Even this is a somewhat misleading term, since most of the 
spreading of nuclear arsenals to various areas of the world is done by the 
nuclear weapon powers
The nuclear arms issue has to be viewed against the background of 
persistent attempts by the overwhelming majority of nations to delegitimize and 
ultimately prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, and the attempts by a smaller 
number of nations to legitimize the use and the threat of use of the weapons
The U N , in its very first resolution in 1946, proclaimed that all 
categories of weapons of mass destruction —  biological, chemical, radiological, 
and nuclear —  should be banned A biological weapons convention has been 
negotiated and come into force Negotiations to ban chemical and radiological 
weapons are underway Only m  the case of nuclear weapons are there no 
negotiations designed to prohibit them Indeed, such efforts that do exist, 
such as NPT and Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) concepts tend to legitimize the 
continuance of nuclear weapons arsenals in the hands of a few powers
It seems to be totally unrealistic for the world to assume that the spread 
of nuclear weapons can be any more effectively controlled and contained than can 
the spread of narcotics In both cases the problem has to be tackled at the 
point of origin —  namely the poppy fields and nuclear weapons producing states 
both demand global solutions Just the U S and industrialized countries cannot 
have local regional solutions against the assault of narcotics, so it is 
difficult to envisage regional solutions to nuclear issues
3II
It is difficult to define South tela in strictly geographical terms If 
Tibet were to be considered as South Asia, then nuclear weapons may already have 
been introduced in the area Taking into account the 200 mile extended economic 
zone, by South Asia, it is also difficult to exclude the water around the Indian 
peninsula from nuclear weapon deployment In that case one can only speculate 
about the presence or absence (within these waters) of superpower naval 
vessel s
The breakdown of the Soviet-American arms control talks also have a serious 
impact on the region Increases m  Soviet nuclear capability as a result of the 
U S  - U S S R  arms race and continuous deployment of more sophisticated 
nuclear weapons are viewed by China with great concern Similarly, any increase 
m  Chinese nuclear capability to counter U S S R  is also to be viewed with 
concern in India While India does not pursue an uncompromising policy towards 
China, the fundamental political, economic, territorial and strategic 
differences have not been removed In the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistani wars, 
China had indirectly threatened to intervene on the side of its ally, Pakistan 
Any U S assistance to China to enhance Chinese nuclear capability to counter 
the Soviet Union's threat adds to the problems in South Asia as well
It is therefore necessary to take steps to curb vertical nuclear 
proliferation before tackling the problem of horizontal nuclear proliferation 
The proposal to establish a nuclear free zone m  South Asia seems to be 
unrealistic because it does not take into account a nuclear armed China getting 
deeply involved in the overall modernization process
4It is also a well known fact by now that the nuclear weapons programme of 
Pakistan was initiated m  a meeting at Multan in January 1972, many months 
before India decided to develop a peaceful nuclear explosive device (PNE) From 
the evidence published m  the west, it would appear that the Israeli nuclear 
capability triggered Pakistani efforts (with financial support from Libya and 
other Islamic states) However, it is difficult to say that Pakistan will be 
irrational enough to join hands with the Arab world against Israel But there 
can be no guarantee against nuclear thefts If Pakistan-Iran relations 
deteriorate and Pakistan decides to share its nuclear know-how with Iraq, there 
will be a serious impact on the politics of the Islamic world This will also 
deprive Pakistan of a friend, namely the U S  , if it decides to help 
anti-Israeli nations of the Arab world
The Indian underground nuclear test was part of a comprehensive and 
broad-based nuclear energy development programme for peaceful purposes In any 
case, it is now common knowledge on the basis of sufficient intelligence that 
India has not built up a nuclear arsenal On the contrary, the U S  in 
particular, and the west m  general, have all possible evidence that Pakistan's 
primary interest lies in a nuclear weapons programme
Pakistan took the position in the conference of the Committee on 
Disarmament in 1970 that there is no distinction between the technologies of PNE 
and those of nuclear weapons and that, therefore, no non-weapon country should 
undertake any PNE This position was maintained till 1981 by the Pakistani 
leaders But since then there seems to be some hedging on this stand In the 
meantime, extensively documented accounts of Pakistan's clandestine purchases of 
plant and equipment for its enrichment and reprocessing technologies seem to 
rule out the possibility of expensive non-weapons related research The
5intention seems to be to obtain weapons-grade fissile material at the earliest 
possible time Pakistan also believes that it has as much right to nuclear 
weapons as the nuclear weapons powers There is little doubt about the fact 
that the nuclear weapons powers have not adopted confidence inspiring behavior 
when dealing with non-nuclear weapons states Pakistan has had its share of 
difficulties m  developing a national identity and in adjusting to its 
environment and, presumably, looks upon nuclear capability as a means of 
ensuring its survival in a hostile environment Whatever the rationale of 
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, it is bound to have repercussions in its 
neighborhood
III
The majority of informed military opinion m  India is of the view that the 
asymmetric possession of a nuclear weapon by Pakistan could not be effectively 
deterred by any conventional superiority of the Indian Armed Forces Nuclear 
weapons can be deterred only by other nuclear weapons It seems logical to 
expect that over a period of time, just as has happened with Israeli and South 
African nuclear wepaons, the U S and some West European nations may come to 
accept a Pakistani nuclear weapon as well The waiver of the Symington 
agreement freeing Washington from having to impose an automatic cutoff of 
conventional arms transfers subsequent to any nuclear test by Pakistan, points 
to an evolving process of acceptance of a nuclear Pakistan
In such circumstances, Pakistan may believe that its nuclear capability 
will paralyse the Indian nuclear decision and Indian conventional forces and 
that it might be possible to undertake a bold strike to liberate Kashmir at a 
time when the Indian leadership is hesitant and faced with internal political
6problems
Given these perceptions m  the subcontinent, it is natural for the people 
of India to demand an adequate matching response No one doubts that India has 
the necessary capability to overtake Pakistan's nuclear capability in a short 
time if it decides to do so Once that happens, there is no reason to believe 
that a state of stable mutua] deterrence would not set in among the two 
subcontinental nations as has happened among other opposing pairs of nations 
New nuclear states will be more concerned for their safety and more mindful of 
dangers than some of the old ones have been The likelihood of war will 
decrease as deterrent and defensive capabilities increase
Since India is the status quo power m  the subcontinent, the stability of 
deterrence will not be unfavorable to India It might at the same time help to 
assuage the sense of insecurity among the Pakistani elite vis a vis both India 
and the Soviet presence m  Afghanistan The development of an increased sense 
of security among the Pakistani elite may have domestic repercussions In the 
short run, the Pakistani military elite may feel secure but in the long run 
security and peace may rob this elite of its justification to remain m  power
It will therefore be of considerable interest to watch the future approach 
of Pakistan's military to the problems of peace, security and political 
development in Pakistan and the region, If as a result of a better security 
enviroment, i e , one m  which there is no perceived threat from India or the 
Soviet Union, they decide in favour of developing the democratic process within 
Pakistan, the victory will be that of democracy But if the military remains m  
power to serve its own interests by the perpetuation of ultra-militarism and an 
arms race in the subcontinent, no one will win Efforts at achieving military 
parity with India will hamper the development processes m  both countries, and
7there will be no substantial reduction of dependence on the superpowers A 
stable South Asia and peace m  the Indian subcontinent is m  the interest not 
-just of South Asians but also of the United States because it will strengthen 
democratic forces in the area rather than military oligarchies
One may also note that Pakistan's tendencies toward fragmentation are more 
of a worry for Islamabad than the threat of invasion from India or the Soviet 
Union It is necessary for the nations of the south Asia region and superpowers 
to ensure that there are no serious attempts at the fragmentation of Pakistan 
A threatened Pakistan is more likely to develop "Pariah" syndrome No amount of 
internal trouble should force Pakistani military leaders to decide to raise a 
war hysteria against India m  order to consolidate internal political order If 
India and Pakistan were to go to war again, Pakistan could only prevail and 
survive as a nation if India conducted itself with enormous restraint Any 
attempt to use nuclear weapons for the sake of a quick grab of territories in 
Kashmir wíl] , at best, invite massive and unrestrained retaliation from India 
and ultimately destroy long term hopes for peace in the region Even to 
simulate such possibilities is a highly disturbing phenomenon and therefore one 
should simulate the scenarios of peace and cooperation rather than that of 
conflict If India and Pakistan can afford to have peace for 15 years since 
1971, there is no reason why peace and development strategies cannot be 
strengthened in both of our nations Let us hope that sanity will prevent the 
use of nuclear weapons and save humanity and human values

